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Abstract
The Domain Naming System (DNS) has been a core technology to the usefulness of
the Internet since the beginning of its public introduction. The ability to associate an
English-readable fully qualified domain name (FQDN) with an IPv4 address is crucial to
its user-friendliness. Due to its age, several flaws have been discovered in its code,
one of the more recent being referenced as CVE-2015-5477, which affects all versions
of Berkeley Internet Naming Daemon (BIND) available before July 31, 2015. We will
cover what this error is, describe and test its effectiveness against an older BIND v.
9.9.6 server, and discuss options for resolving the issue.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction
As the internet has grown, DNS has grown in importance as a provider of
directory information. By far the most popular provider of that information has been the
flavor of DNS known as BIND, or Berkeley Internet Naming Daemon.
During the course of this project, a brief overview of what DNS is and does will
be given. I will also discuss common methods of employing and securing DNS, in
particular BIND v.9. Finally, we will discuss what the issues with this version are, and
why it is still a very real concern despite newer versions being available.

Problem Statement
DNS is very simple. A query is submitted, it responds, and gives information as
to what Internet Protocol (IP) address to request information for. If it doesn’t know, it
refers me on to a server that does. Because of that simplicity, and its importance to the
Internet as it is today, it is often easy to overlook this service as a crucial exposure that
must be secured.

Nature and Significance of the Problem
The nature of the problem is the same as many of the other core technologies of
the internet. DNS was originally designed to make it simpler to track a hundred hosts
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versus keep a long and easily corrupted hosts file. (History of the Domain Name
System, 2000). It now has developed into a hierarchically-structured network of root
servers, Top Level Domain (TLD) roots, and domain hosts that update and maintain
lists of thousands of hosts apiece.
DNS is very old. The first version of BIND DNS was available on June 7 th, 1983.
Though technologies have extended both the usefulness and securability of the DNS
server and of BIND in particular, there are still many holes that must be left due to
compatibility reasons. One of the problems that developers have run into is how to bolt
on additional security to the already-overloaded framework that is BIND. In fact, Rob
Graham of Errata Security, a well-known security firm, is quoted by Dan Goodin of
ArsTechnica (2015) as saying the following:
“The point I'm trying to make here is that BIND9 should not be exposed to the public. It has code
problems that should be unacceptable in this day and age of cybersecurity. Even if it were written
perfectly, it has far too many features to be trustworthy. Its feature -richness makes it a great hidden
master, it's just all those feature get in the way of it being a simple authoritative slave server, or a simple
resolver.”

BIND is popular. A survey done by Internet Systems Consortium (ISC), owners
of BIND, shows that all BIND versions make up 81% of 90,000+ servers listed (July
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2015 Domain Survey, 2015).

BIND
Windows
TinyDNS
MyDNS
Simple DNS
Nominum
PowerDNS
Other

It is interesting to note that, of that 81%, the majority have had their code deprecated
before 2010 and were considered outdated versions of the software.
Along the way errors were introduced. Many were patched, but later versions
had even more errors to correct. 30 years (History of BIND, 2015) of development,
rewrites, and added features later have left a piece of software that is complicated and
slow considering the programming language it was written in (C/C++) (Goodin, 2015).
In addition, DNS was never written to be secure. It was designed for a much
more trusting time in network development. Though BIND is merely an implementation
of this DNS technology, it has carried with it many of the positives and negatives of this
service. Various technologies have been included in the DNS specification to improve
security, such as procedures that verify that the DNS server that responded to a client is
valid for that network. Even DNS Security (DNSSEC), the most widely known and
implemented extension to the DNS protocol for security, is only at about 76% of all Top
Level Domains (Lamb, 2014).
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This particular vulnerability in general affects most versions of BIND from 9.9.8
down. Because the most recent survey was created before the new “fixed” version
came out, there were no statistics to cite at this time. However, as of the time of writing
4 out of the 13 root servers of the internet were reporting versions of the BIND software
that were vulnerable to this exploit (see appendix A). In other words, a massive attack
would likely affect well over half the internet, including 30% of the root DNS servers.
The effects from an attack of that size would be difficult to estimate, but certainly it
would cause issues with DNSSEC on those servers that were unaffected, as DNSSEC
depends on the “chain of trust” being unbroken from one to the next (Reed, 2015). All
from sending one simple DNS query to each of these affected servers.

Objective
The objective is to illustrate how an attacker could use a freely available piece of
software to cripple a DNS server running one of the vulnerable versions of BIND.
Dissecting the attack and looking at the packet traffic that allows this to happen will help
define precisely what mechanisms cause the denial of service. By showing exactly how
the attack is occurring and its consequences the point can be illustrated that critical
services, even those considered as simple as DNS, need to be updated and properly
configured.

Study Questions
This paper will attempt to answer the following questions.
What does this vulnerability look like in practice?
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How easily can this vulnerability be exploited?
What can be done to get around this problem?

Scope of Study
The study of the DNS system and its issues would take a large number of
documents similar to this one. For the purposes of keeping it focused, this document
will cover CVE-2015-5477, a recently uncovered exploit that takes advantage of a
weakness in most versions of BIND when processing the transaction key (TKEY), a
rarely-used record that is still recognized as part of the valid traffic in DNS.
Operating Systems (OS): Linux is an operating system that largely mimics the functions
of UNIX, an older operating system. It is open source and freely available in a wide
variety of variants, or distributions. These different distributions are tailored to specific
roles, such as security, desktops, web servers, and others. This study focuses on two
variants of Linux, CentOS and Kali. CentOS is a distribution of Linux that closely
resembles a common enterprise version of Linux, Red Hat. It will function as the target
machine and is well supported with a great deal of information available for
troubleshooting and testing.
Kali Linux is a distribution of Linux created by Offensive Security. It is available
for free on their website and contains several software packages used for penetration
testing and network testing. It will function as the attacker with an upgrade to its version
of Metasploit. Though a Windows 10 Laptop is used as the host for the virtual
machines, its uses are limited to hosting the VM’s and monitoring packets with
Wireshark.
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Software: BIND version 9.9.6 is among those affected with the bug according to ISC,
the publisher of the BIND software package. BIND 9.10.3 is not vulnerable. These will
be used as our targets, running on the CentOS 7 machines. The configuration will be
noted as appropriate.
Metasploit is a penetration testing package from Rapid7. It is built on a console
and contains modules built for specific attacks. It will be running on the Kali Linux
machine and contains the most recent updates for the bind_tkey exploit written by the
discoverer of the vulnerability, Jonathan Foote.
Wireshark will be used to capture packet data. This is a freely available packet
sniffing product that both displays the binary data and the interpreted packet
information. Captured packets will be used to prove that the attack has been sent by
the attacker and what it contained.

Definition of Terms
Most of the terms are well-defined in the reading and through common
knowledge associated with the subject. However, for the purposes of being internally
consistent, I wish to use the following terms:
Vulnerability: A weakness in the code structure of a piece of software that can
be used to stop or modify the operation of that software against the intentions of the
software coders.
Exploit: A piece of software or code that takes advantage of a vulnerability to
gain some form of control over the operation of the target software.
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Chain of Trust: A key to the operation of DNSSEC. Each DNS server must trust
the server “above” it in the hierarchy (Reed, 2015). Doing this allows each request to
be verified as coming from a valid client, and each response to be validated as coming
from a server that is a trusted source. Servers going down that operate within that
chain can temporarily destabilize this trust relationship.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange: Two computers agree on two numbers, and using
modulus math and a number that is not shared between them create a shared key
between them that allows successful encryption even when both of the first two shared
numbers are known (Young). This type of exchange is used in establishing the chain of
trust.
Zone: A zone is a portion of the network that is under the control of one DNS
server. The hosts in this zone share the network portion of their FQDN, with only the
host name differing between them. An example would be pc1.mike.local and
pc2.mike.local. These would be part of the same zone if the DNS server covered the
mike.local zone.
DNSSEC: DNS Security was developed to help curb the use of fake DNS
responses to mislead users to websites or faulty answers. It uses a Diffie-Hellman style
encryption scheme that allows for a shared key to be created and signs the responses
to both validate that they came from the DNS server and to “speak for” the server above
it, creating the chain of trust.
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Chapter II

BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The recent exposure of this vulnerability has left little time for academic papers to
be written on it. However, the background of the problem is similar to many issues DNS
has had over the years, and thus there is a wealth of information, particularly from the
publisher of the software themselves.
The literature review will be broken into three parts. Part one will discuss the
history and technology behind DNS. Part two will highlight BIND configuration. Finally,
part three will deal with this particular exploit, both in its procedures and what is involved
in its execution.

Literature Related to the Problem
DNS
DNSSEC (Arends, et al, 2005) was developed to ensure that the client can trust
the information being sent back as being sourced at the DNS server we queried. It
establishes a chain of trust that extends from the root servers down to the client. Each
level of server certifies that the one above it is valid. This prevents issues such as a
direct man-in-the-middle attack, or spoofing the DNS server directly. It still allows for
reading or intercepting of the information, as long as it is not changed. It does not
protect the service itself from attack.
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Request for Comments (RFC) 2930 (Eastlake, 2000) describes the need and use
of a transaction key, a key that could be used in various methods of encryption in
different capacities. This not a commonly used option in modern installations, but the
code for using it is still there. The exploit we are detailing has to do with sending a
TKEY that is outside the parameters of the RFC, causing the server to choose to shut
down rather than risk working with corrupted data.
In the Journal of Computer Security, G. Guette (2009) discusses what the
transaction key (TKEY) is, and how it is used to help create the chain of trust. The
article goes on to describe the hierarchical structure of the DNS system, how each zone
is controlled by an authoritative server, and how the hierarchical structure allows the
passing of queries from one zone to the other. This allows queries to pass to the
authoritative server for that zone should the answer not already be known by the server
that first received the query.
BIND
C. Almond (2014) from the ISC goes over the basics of how to set up BIND from
a download of the source. She discusses the download, configuration, compiling, and
installing of the software. This document goes into detail about how to work with the
different options available during compile to add support for such features such as
DNSSEC, and how to configure the running software for use as a recursive (slave)
server.
J. Reed (2015) discusses the basic setup of DNSSEC. Beginning with the
hardware and configuration you need to support it, he then goes on to discuss how to
test to make sure it’s supported in the bind version you have installed. He references
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several other documents on the finer points of setup, but does also discuss the
importance of entropy and how to test to ensure that the system is running via dig.
Jesin A (2014) wrote an article going over the key creation and signed zone file
usage for DNSSEC. Of particular usefulness was the discussion of not only creating
the keys but importing them into the zone file so as to make the zone signing possible.
The tutorial on the named.conf options relating to DNSSEC was also key in getting the
configuration to work.
J. Gorauskas (2015) published an article in Linux Journal that goes over the
setup and use of systemd and unit files. He discusses the differences between the old
SYS V and init-style startup configurations, as well as the basics of how unit files work
and how to configure them. This new system of system initialization allows for more
flexibility and use of newer technology than the init scheme, but requires new files and a
new method of configuration.
TKEY VULNERABILITY
Jonathan Foote (2015) illustrates how to use the Metasploit tool to cause this
assertion error. He is also credited with finding the vulnerability according to the ISC.
He is the author of the tool that can be used within Metasploit to craft the packet with
the necessary fault in the TKEY request.
Due to the frequency of these kinds of attacks, the senior software engineer at
ISC published a discussion of exactly what the errors created by this vulnerability mean
(Morris, 2015). The assertion failure that is created means that the software chose to
close down rather than carry compromised data forward up the chain of trust. In other
words, a software checkpoint was reached and it was decided that it was best to shut
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down in a controlled fashion. This was designed with the idea that a denial of service
was better than allowing that data to continue.
CVE-2015-5477 (2015) describes the method of attack and exactly what it can
do. It acknowledges that the issue exists and suggests that others update their
software immediately. The description indicates that a specially crafted packed can
trigger the vulnerability, and that access control lists (ACL) and other methods of
preventing requests from certain sources will fail as well because the error occurs
during the packet handling and before the packet is exposed to the rules that would
otherwise prevent the failure. The named service would fail with a REQUIRE assertion
failure.
In Security Week, Eduard Kovacs (2015) reiterates the level of danger from this
vulnerability, noting that it is especially dangerous as it affects all version of BIND up to
that point. He notes that the patch is completely effective and there were no
workarounds that he was aware of at the time. Since then a couple of ideas have been
found to minimize the impact but the patch or upgrade to a patched version is the only
complete “cure”.
Cisco also published some information on this issue, putting out a vulnerability
alert that was last updated in October (2015). It notes that a profile is available for the
popular Snort IDS/IPS system that should eliminate the packets that exhibit this TKEY
anomaly from reaching the DNS server. The alert also mentions that there are viable
exploits in the wild for this weakness, and that the likelihood is reduced by the need for
access to a trusted or local network for it to occur.
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Summary
The exploit is available and easily used to shut down versions of BIND that are
vulnerable. The TKEY is part of the DNSSEC encryption scheme and as such is looked
at before the DNS server can deny it based on other rules.
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Chapter III

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Introduction
The study is going to test the assertion failure that causes the DNS server
daemon named to crash. There is one target machine and one attacker. The target is
running a version of BIND, one unpatched and one patched. The Metasploit tool shall
be used on the attacking machine to send the malformed DNS queries to the server,
and the results shall be recorded with wireshark and the resulting information from the
systemctl utility. Wireshark will be running on the host operating system, a Windows 10
laptop.

Hardware and Network
The Linux machines are running on virtual machines created with VMWare
Workstation. The two CentOS machines that are targets will be detailed in their own
section below.
The attacking machine, running Kali 2.0, has additional RAM assigned due to the
requirements of the Metasploit package. Kali 2.0 is a distribution of Linux specially
designed for use with penetration testing, and has many tools already loaded. I did
reload the version of Metasploit that was installed due to a more recent one being
available that included the TKEY compromise. This machine is used for performing the
exploit. For the rest of this document this machine shall be called the Kali box.
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The fourth machine involved is the host machine, a Windows 10 laptop with 8 GB
of ram running VMWare Workstation 12.0. It provides internet access when needed but
otherwise has the external network shut off. This provides less traffic on the ports to
capture and sort.

Linux Setup
On the test target servers, I began by loading CentOS 7. This is a distribution of
Linux that is closely related to Red Hat Enterprise Linux. I chose the defaults
throughout. The only changes to this were the following. I loaded the OpenSSL utilities
by identifying them through a search of available packages through yum. These were
installed, and downloaded BIND 9.9.6 as a compressed file. Once uncompressed, the
code was compiled and installed using the make utility according to the instructions
included with the download.
This version of Linux uses a new system to manage and automatically start
programs. This system, called systemd, uses files called unit files that resemble
Windows .ini files, and include information on how to run the program. The necessary
file to make BIND run under the systemd system was not included, so one was created
as shown here:

named.service
[Unit]
Description=BIND version 9.9.6 DNS server
After=network.target
Wants=
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[Service]
EnvironmentFile=/etc/named.conf
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/named
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
KillMode=process
#Restart=on-failure
Type=forking
RestartSec=

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

The bolded lines indicate important features of this file, called named.service. The file
lists all the needed information to start, restart, or query the program for its status. Of
particular note is the Type, which indicates that this program starts, starts itself again,
and then closes. This allows it to track the child process, not the parent that already
closed. Also of note is the Restart feature, which allows you to automatically restart the
program when it fails.
The BIND system also has to have its environment file configured, and had one
created as below:
named.conf
options {
listen-on port 53 {127.0.0.1; 192.168.13.9; };
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pid-file "named.pid";
recursion yes;
notify yes;
allow-query {any; };
dnssec-enable yes;
#

dnssec-validation auto;

#

dnssec-lookaside auto;

};

include "/etc/named/named.conf.local";

named.conf.local
zone "mike.local" {
type master;
file "/etc/named/zones/db.mike.local.signed"; # zone file path
};

The named.conf file (and its associated file named.conf.local) does several
things. The port was set to 53 (standard for DNS) and DNSSEC was turned on. To do
this required going through further setup, setting up keys and configuring those keys in
the configuration files above. The commands to do so are as follows:
dnssec-keygen -a NSEC3RSASHA1 -b 512 -n ZONE mike.local
dnssec-keygen -f KSK -a NSEC3RSASHA1 -b 512 -n ZONE mike.local
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These commands create the 4 keys necessary to use DNSSEC. Please note that,
because of hardware constraints, the encryption was limited to 512 bit. The traditional
2048 or 4096 bit encryption keys take days to generate on this hardware. These keys
were used to create a signed zone file with this command:
dnssec-signzone -o mike.local -t db.mike.local

The signed zone file is a file that lists each of the hosts (computers) in the network that
the DNS serves. The signed version contains the keys necessary to enable DNSSEC
for those hosts. Here is a portion of the file in use here.
bind9.mike.local.

604800 IN A

192.168.13.9

604800 RRSIG A 7 3 604800 (
20151211162621 20151111162621 3872 mike.local.
PxkzmGT8AFKrISYMDrgRQUFTYE7+/Vt51b2E
LXF+BXaJrWI/QggfsG2KCoGg7KissIIrtu8q
BbZgf4oGYRPA6Q== )

This gives both the resource record signature needed for communication (RRSIG) and
the IP address associated with it.

Initial testing confirmed with the dig command shows that the system is
recognizing and using the encryption:
[root@bind9 ~]# dig DNSKEY mike.local. @localhost +multiline

; <<>> DiG 9.9.6 <<>> DNSKEY mike.local. @localhost +multiline
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;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 11268
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;mike.local.

IN DNSKEY

;; ANSWER SECTION:
mike.local.

604800 IN DNSKEY 256 3 7 (
AwEAAa5Hqhm+plUkSv8NfvbUqq2Et4nkeRFxcfvLM6d1
u6gZBfxwkim5Zx3+V9CIOzEwayZCJc6sNXQ7rND7mu/Y
FNs=
) ; ZSK; alg = NSEC3RSASHA1; key id = 3872

mike.local.

604800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 7 (
AwEAAa+aNVcT8XkIOsv5XdHrRclPQn5fG4NuF9Ppcm1H
d9rSEwdC0iP/cZRU4e5fhK15vOH/n/dlcQbHnXJQJuXC
ss8=
) ; KSK; alg = NSEC3RSASHA1; key id = 9765

;; Query time: 53 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1)
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;; WHEN: Thu Nov 12 13:00:48 CST 2015
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 207

BIND is in operation with DNSSEC enabled and successfully returning queries.
The second machine, running BIND 9.10.3, was a copy of the virtual machine
made while the first was turned off. This enabled us to use exactly the same
configuration and versions of software. BIND 9.10.3 was installed in exactly the same
manner, with the same keys and zone files. The BIND 9.9.6 machine was assigned IP
192.168.13.9, while the 9.10.3 machine had .10.
The Kali Linux box was also installed as default. The only change made was
updating to the version of Metasploit that includes the bind_tkey exploit written by the
discoverer of the weakness, Jonathan Foote. The Kali box was assigned
192.168.13.11.

Procedure
The test was begun by starting the named (BIND) service on the CentOS 7
servers. Other than the version of BIND loaded, both were treated identically.
systemctl start named
[root@bind9 log]# systemctl status named
named.service - BIND version 9.9.6 DNS server
Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/named.service; disabled)
Active: active (running) since Wed 2015-11-11 19:30:24 CST; 4 h 4min ago
Process: 39964 ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/named (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS)
Main PID: 39965 (named)
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CGroup: /system.slice/named.service
└─39965 /usr/local/sbin/named

Once it was confirmed that this was up and running, the Kali machine was
started and Metasploit was called with the msfconsole command.
root@kali:~# msfconsole
=[ metasploit v4.11.5-2015110401

]

+ -- --=[ 1500 exploits - 864 auxiliary - 251 post

]

+ -- --=[ 432 payloads - 37 encoders - 8 nops

]

+ -- --=[ Free Metasploit Pro trial: http://r-7.co/trymsp ]

The TKEY exploit is loaded and configured with the IP of the DNS server to attack.

msf > use auxiliary/dos/dns/bind_tkey
msf auxiliary(bind_tkey) > show options

Module options (auxiliary/dos/dns/bind_tkey):

Name
----

Current Setting Required Description
--------------- -------- -----------

BATCHSIZE 256
INTERFACE
RHOSTS
RPORT

yes
no
yes

53

yes

The number of hosts to probe in each set
The name of the interface
The target address range or CIDR identifier
The target port
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SRC_ADDR

no

Source address to spoof

THREADS 10

yes

The number of concurrent threads

msf auxiliary(bind_tkey) > set RHOSTS 192.168.13.9-192.168.13.10
RHOSTS => 192.168.13.9-192.168.13.10

The packet is then sent with the run command. The structure of the packet as
captured by Wireshark follows the command.
msf auxiliary(bind_tkey) > run

[*] Sending packet to 192.168.13.9
[*] Sending packet to 192.168.13.10
[*] Scanned 2 of 2 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
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Notice that the highlighted portion of the packet is where the TKEY is stored.
The TKEY is very rarely used in modern communication, but because of backwards
compatibility is still maintained in the code.
On the BIND 9.9.6 server, the following is the response.

Nov 11 23:34:23 bind9.localdomain named[35349]: exiting (due to assertion failure)
Nov 11 23:34:24 bind9.localdomain systemd[1]: named.service: main process exited, code=dumped,
status=6/ABRT
Nov 11 23:34:24 bind9.localdomain systemd[1]: Unit named.service entered failed state.

The assertion failure as discussed by Jonathan Foote and S. Morris means that BIND
found incorrect information and chose to stop, rather than continue on. No damage has
been done. The service can be restarted safely.
On the BIND 9.10.3 server, the following response was given:

The capture above appears to show that the BIND 9.9.6 server (IP 192.168.13.9)
crashed but the BIND 9.10.3 server (IP 192.168.13.10) was unreachable. However, this
is captured at the 9.10.3 server itself.
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This indicates that the program sent an unreachable message as opposed to giving any
indication that the attacker had reached a valid server. The named process was
running fine and of the same PID after as before. It was unaffected. The unreachable
message was intentionally sent to throw attackers off and appear as though there is no
DNS server at that address.

Remedies
Three remedies were discussed in the readings, and one was found during
experimentation.
The first is suggested by Cisco, noting that a profile of this intrusion is available
for the popular Snort intrusion detection/prevention system:
Administrators are advised to implement an intrusion prevention system (IPS) or intrusion detection
system (IDS) to help detect and prevent attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability.
Administrators are advised to apply Snort SID 35424 to help prevent attacks that attempt to exploit the
vulnerability. (Cisco, 2015)

In essence this would block the misconfigured requests from ever getting to the DNS
server. If one were to get through or be introduced from a host on the same network as
the DNS server (assuming the IDS is monitoring external traffic only), the Snort system
would provide no protection at all.
The next two are related, and both come from ISC, the developer of BIND.
There is a patch that is available, the text of which is here (CVE-2015-5477, 2015):
diff --git a/lib/dns/tkey.c b/lib/dns/tkey.c
index 66210d5..34ad90b 100644
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--- a/lib/dns/tkey.c
+++ b/lib/dns/tkey.c
@@ -654,6 +654,7 @@ dns_tkey_processquery(dns_message_t *msg, dns_tkeyctx_t *tctx,
* Try the answer section, since that's where Win2000
* puts it.
*/
+

name = NULL;
if (dns_message_findname(msg, DNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qname,
dns_rdatatype_tkey, 0, &name,
&tkeyset) != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {

Though this is technically a valid fix, it should be noted that the publisher does
not guarantee that this will work for all versions of the software. The diff command puts
the code into the tkey.c source code file at the proper line numbers as highlighted.
What is interesting is that the only difference between this and the original code is that
they are identical except for the name= NULL command. The name field is not being
reinitialized like it should have.
A more supported fix is to upgrade to the latest versions available, 9.9.7-P2 or
9.10.2-P3. All versions previous to this will be affected by this issue. As can be seen
above, this does address the problem and prevent the assertion failure.
Finally, one partial solution came about as an accident during testing. If a
vulnerable version of BIND is installed on a system using systemd, the .service file can
be configured to automatically restart the daemon as soon as it crashes. Since the
vulnerability is essentially a denial of service and doesn’t harm the daemon or data it
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uses, this would be a valid workaround. To apply this, the named.service file should be
configured as such:
[Unit]
Description=BIND version 9.9.6 DNS server
After=network.target
Wants=

[Service]
EnvironmentFile=/etc/named.conf
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/named
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
KillMode=process
Restart=on-failure
Type=forking
RestartSec=

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

Notice that the # sign was removed from the bolded line, making this a valid command
and not just a comment. This will ensure that the system will restart the daemon as
soon as it crashes, minimizing any inaccessible time. This only masks the issue, and
does not solve the underlying problem. It may be useful for situations where it is not
desirable to upgrade the software.
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Summary
The BIND versions affected by this vulnerability are still a very large part of the
functioning DNS servers on the internet. As a result, despite this vulnerability existing
largely in should be taken very seriously. Though no damage is done to the software or
data, the denial of service can restrict access to large parts of a network simply because
the names do not resolve into IP addresses.
The widely available exploit (as part of the Metasploit software package) inserts
an invalid entry into the DNS query and specifies that it should be read as a TKEY
value. This invalid value then flags the BIND software to exit with an assertion error.
As a result, the daemon crashes and no further DNS queries are answered.
The severity of this issue is limited by the availability of easy-to-use code patches
and updated versions. The fact that these are available means that no one should run
vulnerable versions of the software. The awareness of the entire community as shown
by the articles from Security Week and ArsTechnica should guarantee that every
administrator out there knows what’s going on. The fact that 4 out of the 13 root servers
still run out of date versions (along with a majority of the Internet’s DNS network) proves
that it will still be a valid concern for some time to come.
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Appendix A

Version Responses from four of the 13 Root servers on the Internet

; <<>> DiG 9.8.2rc1-RedHat-9.8.2-0.37.rc1.el6_7.4 <<>> @b.root-servers.net version.bind chaos txt
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 3645
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;version.bind.

CH

TXT

;; ANSWER SECTION:
version.bind.

0

CH

TXT

CH

NS

"4.8.1"

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
version.bind.

0

version.bind.

;; Query time: 89 msec
;; SERVER: 192.228.79.201#53(192.228.79.201)
;; WHEN: Fri Oct 30 15:37:11 2015
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;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 62

; <<>> DiG 9.8.2rc1-RedHat-9.8.2-0.37.rc1.el6_7.4 <<>> @d.root-servers.net version.bind chaos txt
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 45590
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;version.bind.

CH

TXT

;; ANSWER SECTION:
version.bind.

0

CH

TXT

CH

NS

"BIND 9.8"

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
version.bind.

0

version.bind.

;; Query time: 40 msec
;; SERVER: 199.7.91.13#53(199.7.91.13)
;; WHEN: Fri Oct 30 15:38:52 2015
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 65
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; <<>> DiG 9.8.2rc1-RedHat-9.8.2-0.37.rc1.el6_7.4 <<>> @f.root-servers.net version.bind chaos txt
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 8951
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;version.bind.

CH

TXT

;; ANSWER SECTION:
version.bind.

0

CH

TXT

"9.9.7-P1"

CH

NS

version.bind.

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
version.bind.

0

;; Query time: 234 msec
;; SERVER: 192.5.5.241#53(192.5.5.241)
;; WHEN: Fri Oct 30 15:39:47 2015
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 65
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; <<>> DiG 9.8.2rc1-RedHat-9.8.2-0.37.rc1.el6_7.4 <<>> @m.root-servers.net version.bind chaos txt
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 58072
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;version.bind.

CH

TXT

;; ANSWER SECTION:
version.bind.

0

CH

TXT

CH

NS

"9.9.7-P3"

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
version.bind.

0

version.bind.

;; Query time: 146 msec
;; SERVER: 202.12.27.33#53(202.12.27.33)
;; WHEN: Fri Oct 30 15:42:00 2015
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 65

